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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RALPH L. CONK,
PlaintiffAppellant,
vs.

Case Number 16227

WALLACE L. CHAMBERS, M.D.,
and GRANGER MEDICAL CLINIC,
a corporation,
DefendantsRespondents.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE 'TWO ISSUE RULE' URGED BY THE RESPONDENT SHOULD
NOT BE ADOPTED BY THIS COURT AND IF ADOPTED,
SHOULD NOT APPLY TO THE CASE AT BAR.
Respondent's first assertion in his brief is that if any
error is found in the trial court's conduct of the trial it
is harmless error because other issues were error free. This
theory has been referred to as the "two issue rule."
urged that this court should adopt that rule.

It is

(Respondent's

Brief pp. 11-20).
Appellant takes the position that the "two issue rule"
is not the rule in Utah, has never been the rule in Utah,
does not fit the structure of Utah law, is not a just rule,
and should not be adopted by the Court.

Nonetheless, even

under the premises of the "two issue rule" the errors claimed
by Rppellant constitute prejudicial error.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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As a first step toward the analysis of the two issue
rule in the case at bar appellant asserts that the allegations
error in his brief are in fact error as briefed earlier.
of those allegations will be discussed again later in

Cert

rep~~

respondent's arguments in this reply brief.
Of major importance, however, in addition to the authoriti
cited in appellant's brief is the undeniable error corrunitted i:.
Instruction Numbers 24 and 25 (R. 163

&

164), and the Court's

failure to direct a verdict in appellant's favor on the
issue of the statute of limitations, and failure to grant appE:
lant' s motion for a new trial.

Subsequent to the filing of

appellant's brief the Supreme Court of Utah announced its
decision in the case of Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144
(1979).

Therein the Court was confronted with one of the

identical issues presented in Point I(A-D) pages 5-29 in
Appellant's Brief concerning whether the statute of limitation'
(§79-14-4 U.C.A., 1953) commences to run from the date of
injury or from the date an injured person knows or should
know that a known injury was caused by what is alleged to be
a negligent act.

Citing most of the same authorities as those

cited in appellant's brief the Court held, "

that t~

statute begins to run when an injured person knows or should
know that he has suffered a legal injury," and further,

...

the two year provision does not commence to run until
the injured person knew or should have known that he had
sustained an injury and the injury was caused by negligent
action."

The instructions were erroneous and the evide~e

as cited previously can only lead to the conclusion that it
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was indeed error of major proportion to submit the issue to
the jury at all.
The error(s) at the trial court level having been established
we next confront the "two issue rule."

One thing is patently

clear from all of the cases in favor of and opposed to the
"two issue rule"; it is no more and no less than a method to
determine when an error is prejudicial.

In Utah that determination

is governed by Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
No error in either the admission or the
exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect
in any ruling or order or in anything done or
omitted by the court or by any of the parties,
is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal
to take such action appears to the court incons istant with substantial justice. . . .
(emphasis added)
Therefore, in determining whether an error is "inconsistent
with substantial justice," we must look to the court's decisions.
In Joseph v. L.D.S. Hospital, 7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P.2d 330 (1957),
the Court reversed the trial court to allow plaintiff to read and
argue to the jury notations by defendant on hospital records that
were already placed in evidence.
was error, it was harmless error.

Defendant urged that if it
The court found the error

to be prejudicial over defendant's protestations:
Neither this statutory [Rule 61, supra.]
mandate, nor the policy we follow thereunder,
goes so far as to require that we ignore errors
that may have a substantial effect upon the outcome of the trial.
It is not always easy to tell when an error
should be regarded as prejudicial • . • · ~t is
necessary to survey all of the facts.and.circumstances disclosed by the record and if, in so
doing, the error appears to be of such a.nature
that it can be said with assurance that it was
of no material consequence in its effect upon
the trial because reasonable minds would have
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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arrived at the same result, regardless of such
error, it would be harmless and the granting of
a new trial would not be warranted.
On the other
hand, it it appears to be of sufficient moment
that there is a reasonable likelihood that in
the absence of such error a different result
would have eventuated, the error should be
regarded as prejudicial and relief should be
granted.
Measured by such considerations we assay
the possible effect of the error complained of,
realizing of course that it is now quite impossible to tell definitely whether the verdict
would have been different.
(318 P.2d at 333)
(emphasis added)
See also, Startin v. Madsen, 120 U. 631, 237 P. 2d 834 (1951);
Boyd v. San Pedro, L.A.&S.L.R. Co., 45 U.449, 146 P.2d 282
(1915); Hillyard v. Utah By-Products, 1 U2d 143, 263 P.2d 287
(1953).
The alleged errors before this court taken singly and/or
collectively show a "reasonable likelihood that in the absence
of such error(s) a different result would have eventuated.'
The Joseph, supra, case is law in Utah on what constitute:
harmless or harmful error.

Respondent would take the just

discretion from the hands of the court by means of an artifici:
rule that has at best received mixed reviews and that would no:
allow the court to review each case by looking into the entire:
of the law and evidence in determining whether a given error
is "inconsistent with substantial justice."

Rule 61, ~·

The Supreme Court of the United States has taken the
position in a Federal Antitrust action under the Clayton

Act

(15 USC Section 17) which is governed by Rule 61 of the Federa:
.
tternec
Rules of Civil Procedure after which Utah Rule 61 is pa
in pertinent part that a general verdict cannot be upheld
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1f

error was committed upon any one issue either in the admission
of evidence of in the charge of the court.

The Court stated

its position as follows:
Since we hold erroneous one theory of liability
upon which the general verdict may have rested-a conspiracy among petitioner and Exchange Lemon-it is unnecessary for us to explore the legality
of the other theories. As was stated of a general
verdict in Maryland use of Markley v. Baldwin, 112
U.S. 490, 493, 28 L.ed. 822, 823, 5 Sup.Ct. 278
(1884), "[I)ts generality prevents us from
perceiving upon which plea they found.
If, therefore, upon any one issue error was committed,
either in the admission of evidence, or in the charge
of the court, the verdict cannot be upheld . . . "
Sunkist Growers, Inc., et al. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus
Products Co. et al., 370 U.S. 19, 8 L.ed.2d 305, 82 Sup.Ct.
1130, reh den 370 U.S. 965, 8 L.ed.2d 834, 82 Sup.Ct. 1577 (1962).
The position of the Supreme Court in the Sunkist, supra, case
has been followed in a large number of jurisdictions.

Such

jurisdictions uniformly base their decisions on the proposition
that where error is committed and where justice requires
reversal of a case in order to insure a a litigant a fair trial,
prejudice will be presumed.

They acknowledge that there is

a split in opinion among various jurisdictions on the "two
issue rule", but have determined that their policy is the
better reasoned, more just and in the majority. See, e.g.,
Bredouw v. Jones, 431 P.2d 413 (Okla. 1967) and the cases
cited therein; Burrows v. Hawaiian Trust co., 417 P.2d 816
(Haw. 1966) and the cases cited therein; Maccia v. Tynes,
120 A.2d 263 (N.J. 1956) and the cases cited therein.
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Similarily, this Court long ago in an analagous

situati~

involving inconsistent instructions to a jury held that it is
reversible error to so instruct a jury because the court cannot
tell whether the jury followed the correct or incorrect
instruction.

Konold v. D.&R.G.W. Ry. Co.,

21 Utah 379, 60

P. 1201 (1900).
Likewise, in the case at bar, it is impossible for the Co::
to determine whether the jury made its decision based upon enc
in a given instruction or on an error free instruction.

T~

law in Konold, supra, has not changed since that time and shoul:
not at this late date.
The "two issue rule" proposed by respondent is supposedly
designed to simplify the work of trial courts and to limit
the scope of the proceedings on review.

Colonial Stores, Inc.

v. Scarborough, 355 So.2d 1181 (Fla. 1978).

That certainly is

a calous concept of the "substantial justice" of Rule 61, ~·
Convenience of the trial and appellate courts should never
be an impediment to a fair trial of the issues between parties
litigant.
The "two issue rule" places the burden on the appellant t!
have prepared and submitted special interrogatories to the
jury if the respondents can affirmatively demonstrate on appea.
that there are at least two distinct dispositive issues one
or more of which is error free and supported by substantial
evidence.

Royal Homes,

Inc. v. Dalene Hardwood Flooring~
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199 A.2d 698
supra.

(Conn. 1964); Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Scarborough,

The opposing line of cases previously cited would place

the burden of the special interrogatories on the respondents.
Respondent in proposing the "two issue rule" to the court
represents that the appellant in this case has waived his right to claim
the errors asserted in his brief because he did not request that
the trial court submit the issues upon special interrogatories.
The appellant should not be penalized in this action for following
the admonition of this Court not to submit special interrogatories
to juries in negligence actions between two parties:
A majority of the members of the court are of the
opinion that in cases such as this . . . it would
be better practice to submit the case to the jury
upon a general verdict.
It appears that the
best efforts of trial judges to make interrogatories simple, concise and understandable still
result in juries misunderstanding what was intended.
Barton v. Jensen, 19 U.2d 196, 429 P.2d 44, 46
(1967).
The law of Barton, supra vitiates against the adoption
of the respondent's proposed rule.

There is structurally no

way that a party, whether he be defendant or plaintiff,
can ever know whether or not a given error which, on its
face is prejudicial, was the determinative factor in the
case.

If the burden were placed on Conk to present special

interrogatories in order to claim that such a patent error is
predjudicial it would be a burden
by this Honorable Court.

never

recognized as such

Furthermore, it would be unfair.

Let us carry this point out one step furhter.

-7-

Conk is admonished
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by this Supreme Court not to confuse the jury with special
interrogatories and then is told that because he didn't
submit special interrogatories his appeal fails for not sustair.
the burden of showing that a patent critical error in the
instructions was in fact prejudicial.
is ludicrous.

Such a proposition

More importantly it is simply not the law of

this State.
Respondent claims at page 20 of his brief that he, "advan;
three separate and distinct defenses at the time of trial:
First, that the defendants were not negligent; second,

that~

negligence was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's rena:
failure; and third, that the plaintiff's claims were
the statute of limitations."

barr~~

A medical malpractice action sue

as this involves difficult scientific issues that are unavoida!
enmeshed with the legal issues.

This creates a situation wherr

in the "two issue rule" simply cannot be applied.

The

"distinct determinative issue requirement" cannot be met. consL
for example the matters that must be resolved in determining
when the statute of limitations would begin to run as in the
case at bar if, arguendo, the facts supported its submission
to the jury which appellant continues to deny.
1.

At what point in time an injury, i f any, occurred?

2.
At what point in time an injury, i f any, occurred
to a legally protected right?
3.
right?

Who caused the invasion of the legally protected

4.
At what point in time the "injury" was or should
have been discovered by the injured individual?
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5.
Whether or not certain acts of the offending
individual would act to conceal the above from the injured party?
6.
Whether or not the offending individual fulfilled
his duty to disclose relevant material information?
7.

What information was relevant and material?

8.
Whether the injured individual acted prudently during
the course of his treatment and thereafter in making reasonable
inquiry to discover the above?
Each of the above issues contains some elements of
proximate cause and negligence.

The net effect is

that if there is error in any one of the three major defenses
asserted by defendant, it poisons the other issues and the
entire proceeding.
Where, as is alleged by appellant, there exists multiple
errors in failing to grant a directed verdict on specific
issues, coupled with failure to properly instruct the jury
on those issues the error has even greater impact on the
intertwined defenses.

The fallacy of the contention that

the issues are distinct and not interrelated is most apparent.
In sununary, the "two issue rule" is not the law in Utah
and has never been the law.

Under the framework of Utah law

and the better reasoned authority it should not be adopted.
Even if it is adopted, it should not apply to the issues of
this case as the submission of written interrogatories to
perfect the record for appeal was specifically discouraged
by this Court at all times prior to this particular appeal

and appellant was adhering to that policy and should not now
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be punished for said adherence to Court mandate.

Even if

the "two issue rule" is adopted by the Court it does not fit
a medical malpractice case involving the issue of the statute
of limitations because the issues once submitted to the jury
are so intertwined that they are no longer "distinct issues"
as contemplated by the "rule".
POINT II
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DIRECTED THE VERDICT FOR THE
PLAINTIFF ON THE ISSUE OF INFORMED CONSENT
Only brief mention need be made on the issue of respondent
failure to obtain informed consent from appellant.
has been fully covered in the brief of appellant.

That issue
But respon-

dent's brief requires further comment.
Respondent now wishes this Court to believe that the proce
was not experimental.

It appears that the procedure is

"experimental" or "not experimental" at the "convenience" of
the respondent.

In proceedings in another case that predated

the matter currently before the court the procedure was "exper·
imental" and he did so inform the patient because it was impor~
to do so.

(R. 787-788).

Then at his deposition in the presen:

matter the operation was "not experimental" and therefore he
did not inform Mr. Conk of that fact.

(R. 258 and R. 788-7 891

Then at the time of trial, knowing that he would be confrontei
with previous testimony it became convenient for the procedure
to be experimental again.

(R. 787-788) Only at trial for

the first time was it "inconvenient" for him not to have
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1· nfor

(

his patient that the operation was "experimental" so he
. believe(s) . • .

'or' . . . thinks . . • ", but he is not

sure that he revealed that critical fact to his patient.
789).

(R. 788-

Now, on appeal respondent has chosen again to flip flop

on his own admission and say that procedure was "not experimental"
(Respondent's Brief at 22-23).

That, certainly, is an incred-

ible performance that places the doctor's testimony clearly
in the status of being so internally inconsistent as to refute
itself and not worthy as a defense in light of appellant's
unequivocal denial of being informed that the operation was
experimental (R. 435-436).

The trial court erred in not directing

the jury's verdict on informed consent as moved by appellant
(R. 1370-1372)

Respondent's testimony cannot support a verdict

in his favor on that issue.

See, e.g., State v. Pratt, 25 U.2d

76, 475 P.2d 1013 (1970); Alvardo v. Tucker, 2 U.2d 16, 268
P.2d 986

(1954).

Respondent further seems to imply that he did not owe a
duty to inform this patient that the operation was experimental
because the risk of the type of kidney damage suffered by the
appellant was unknown to the profession at that time.
pondent' s Brief Point II).

(R~s

In addition, respondent contends that

because the risk of kidney damage was unknown at that time,
no liability should attach because there was no failure to inform
of a known risk.
That is a circuitous argument of no merit when one considers
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an "experimental" procedure.

By its very definition, "experirr,,·

means that the procedure is not merely new, but so new that
all of the potential serious risks cannot be known.

If a

patient is to be a guinea pig he should be entitled to know
that fact.

If he is not so informed and he is caused

physi~l

or mental damage as a result of the experiment from any unknown risk, he should prevail.

The unknown risk is what

makes the procedure experimental.
caused the damage.

The unknown risk is what

(It should be kept in mind that appellant

does not concede that the potential for kidney damage was
unknown risk.

~

See Appellant's Brief Point II pages 37-58).

An early Utah case not cited previously very aptly

s~t~

the burden on a physician to give adequate information to his
patient so that he can make intelligent decisions as to his
own choice of medical care and treatment.
58 U 238, 197 P 1043 (1921),

In Everts v. Worrel:

the defendant injected the plaint

with serum designed to resolve an "acne" problem.

Within

a relatively short time the plaintiff was paralyzed from the
waist down.

Defendant alleged that he had given the plaintiff

certain instructions that were not followed.

The Court stated

that the instructions were insufficient in that they ''. · · ~!

merely perfunctory and in no way enlightening to plaintiff
respecting his condition."

(58

u at 249-250).

The court went

to state the law regarding what a physician should inform hl
patient:
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5

It is incumbent on a physician to give
such instructions as are proper and necessary
to enable the patient or his nurses and attendants to act intelligently in the further treatment of the case, and failure to do so is negligence which will render him liable for injury
resulting therefrom.
(58 Utah at 250) (emphasis added)
A Federal Tort Claims Act case interpreting New Mexico law
in which a Veterans Administration doctor administered massive
radiation therapy for treatment of cancer in a patient without informing him of the drastic and experimental nature of
the procedure is enlightening on the legal obligation of a
physician.
. . • our legal system requires that the
treatment to be administered must be within the
bounds of recognized medical standards in order
to overcome legal challenges such as that presented in this case. Accordingly, in order for
a physician to avoid liability by engaging in
drastic or experimental treatment which exceeds
the bounds of established medical standards his
patient must be fully informed of the experimental
nature of the treatment and of the foreseeable
consequences· of the treatment. (emphasis added)
Ahern v. Veterans Administration, 537 F.2d 1098, 1102 (10th Cir.
1976).

See also, Gatson v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 350-351

(Ariz. 1978).
In this case, as a matter of law, the evidence leads to
but one conclusion, the appellant was not given adequate
information upon which to give an informed consent to the
operation performed on him.
The challenged Instruction Numbers 15 and 16 are prejudicial
error as argued in Point II of Appellant's Brief at pages 54-58.
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However, respondent at pages 26 and 27 of his brief, again
implies the circuitous argument that a physician cannot be
held accountable for his failure to inform a patient that an
operation is "experimental" because the risks are unknown.
That cannot be left unchallenged, as the argument suggests
the proper resolution for the doctor; simply to inform ·
the patient that the risks attendant to the procedure are
not known.

The respondent failed to make such a disclosure

on an item of great significance to his patient and even
under his own theory should be liable for the damages caused
by his ommission to obtain his patient's informed consent.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE
ISSUE OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
TO THE JURY AND COMPOUNDED THAT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR BY SUBMITTING THE ISSUE
UNDER IMPROPER INTRUCTIONS

Respondent makes an attempt in his brief to mask his
own failure to present any evidence to support his affirm~~
defense that the appellant's cause of action should be barred
by the statute of limitations.

(See Appellant's Brief pages:

At Point IV of his brief, pages 37 to 41, he states that
t.ion nos. 24 and.
.
.
' s objections to instruc
.
. . th e p 1 aintiff
are raised for the first time on appeal and need not be consi:'
That simply is not true.

The trial court's attention was

-14-
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directed to the issue of when the appellant discovered " . . •
or through the use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered
the injury . . . "

[Section 78-12-28 (3) U.C.A.) in appellant's

motion for directed verdict (R. 1370-1373), in his exceptions to
the instructions (R. 1338-1339) and again in his motion for
new trial and supporting brief (R. 225-227).

At each such point

in time the trial court was cited authority on the issue of
when the cause of action would accrue so that the two year period
of the statute would begin running.

The cases cited by respondent

stand for the proposition that the purpose of taking exceptions
is to bring to the attention of the trial court errors so that
they might in the interests of justice be corrected.

Those

errors were brought to the attention of the trial judge and he
failed to remedy them on three different occasions prior to
this appeal.
At the time of trial, the case of Foil v. Ballinger,
supra, had not yet been decided by this Court.

Therein, as

the Court will recall, is precise support for the position asserted
by the appellant.

As to those errors in instruction numbers 24

and 25, respondent has by his silence conceded the point.

The

fact that the trial court could not be appraised of a decision
not yet made by the Supreme Court does not in any manner diminish
the damaging and prejudicial effect of those errors upon
the rights of Conk at the trial.
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Let us assume for the sake of argument only that there wa:
a true issue of fact on the statute of limitations and that th,
trial court was not advised in sufficient detail of its errors
as asserted by respondent.

This Court should still reverse tho

judgment in this case and remand this matter to the trial coun
the interest of justice.

Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure states in pertinent part:
. . • No party may assign as error the giving
or the failure to give an instruction unless he
objects thereto.
In objecting to the giving of
an instruction, a party must state distinctly
the matter to which he objects and the grounds
for his objection.
Notwithstandin~ the foregoing
requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and in the interests of justice, may
review the giving or failure to give an instruction.
(emphasis added)
Most, if not all, courts have declared that they have the
authority to relax the strict requirements of a rule of procedure in order to avoid surprise or a serious miscarriage of
justice or to otherwise aid in fulfilling the purposes of t~b
appellate jurisdiction.

See, e.g. McCarrey v. Cornrnissione~

Resources, 526 P. 2d 1353 (Ala. 1974); Moore v. Burdman, 526 p,:
893 (Wash. 1974).
This Court has long stated that Rule 51, supra, must gove:
procedure and "

[is) to be followed unless some pers~sb

reason to the contrary invokes the discretion of the court to
extricate a person from a situation where some gross injustW
or inequity would otherwise result."
364, 274 P.2d 962 (1954).

. k

McCall v. Hen d ric:._,

2

u.:

See also State v. Cobo, 60 p,2d 9 ~

(Utah 1936); State v. Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d 193 (Utah 197 6)
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wherein at 545 P.2d at 196 footnote 6, the Court stated,
. this court may . . . notice errors if it is convinced
that an injustice has resulted • . . "
Continuing with the assumption for argument's sake that
no exceptions at all were made to the instructions at issue in
this argument point, there could never be a clearer case of
injustice than the one presented by this case.

At

the time of trial neither the trial court nor the parties had
the benefit of this Court's decision in Foil, supra.

It

would be a gross miscarriage of justice to deny an appellant
the right to raise such an acutely prejudicial misstatement of the law as is contained in the trial court's instructions.
If this situation does not fit the exception of Rule 51, no
civil case could ever fit within its parameters.

The exception

would constitute an empty gesture of fairness and justice without
substance.
Nonetheless, this Court should never reach the necessity of
making that decision in the case at bar.
raised in the trial court.

The issues were properly

More important than that, however,

is the basic merit to the proposition that the issue of the
statute of limitations should never have been presented to the
jury.

On any "discovery" theory, the record is devoid of affirm-

ative facts to support the defense.

(See Appellant's Brief

pp. 30-37).

-17Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION

Respondent in his statement of facts has chosen to go wel

beyond any reasonable inference that the facts of this case w
support.

Therefore, appellant will stand by his statement of

the relevant facts as stated in various parts of his briefs.

Respondent has conceded that the instructions on the stat

of limitations given to the jury by the trial court are in err

However, respondent claims that the exceptions taken by appell
were not sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.

The tri

was fully appraised of the problem areas of its instructions

at the time of the motion for directed verdict, the exceptions
to the instructions, and at the motion for new trial.

Even

if no exceptions at all were taken the Foil decision

comi~~

the case at bar was already on appeal would dictate a reversal
Otherwise, a grave injustice would result which would fit
directly into the exception stated in Rule 51 of the Utah Rul1
of Civil Procedure.
Whether the exceptions taken at the time of trial were
sufficient is moot in any event.

The evidence and all reason

able inferences taken therefrom dictate that appellant's rnoti
for a directed verdict on both the issue of the statute
of limitations and informed consent should have been granted.
Any instructions given to the jury on those is sues would be
prejudicial error.

Only the issues of causation and damages

should have gone to the jury.
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Respondent has advanced to this court that it should
adopt the "two issue rule."
rule in Utah.

That "rule" has never been the

Its basic tenets are contrary to the framework

of past Utah law including, but not limited to the definitions
of prejudicial error, and the policy not to look behind the
jury's decision to determine whether the verdict is based
upon a proper instruction or upon an instruction with
prejudicial error contained in it.

The "two issue rule" is

further contrary to the better reasoned authority and is not
the majority rule.
Additionally, if the court were to adopt the "two issue
rule" and apply it to this case, it would punish this
appellant for following the Court's prior admonition not to
confuse juries with special interrogatories.

Such a retro-

active application of the "rule" should not be made.
Further, when the trial court chose to submit the issue
of the statute of limitations in this case, the other issues
became so interrelated with it that they were no longer
distinct determinative issues as is required in the "two
issue rule." The case at bar would not fit into that category
of cases that could be resolved by the "two issue rule."
This is especially true when the multiple errors committed
in this case are viewed as they relate to one another and
the other issues.
Appellant refers the court to his conclusion in his
brief in chief as an outline of wherein error has been committed
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in the areas discussed in this Reply Brief as well as the other
of error from which relief is requested.

It is respectfully

submitted to this Court that this appeal is meritorious on
all points raised by the appellant.

The judgment

should~

reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
DATED this 4th day of March, 1980.
BLACK & MOORE

ES R. BLACK
Attorneys for Appellant
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